Report on the J-20 Mighty Dragon fighter and Chinese military power | 2025
By Kike Gandia · Defense & Geopolitics · 41 min read
In today's geopolitical landscape, control of the air remains one of the most decisive strategic factors. The Chengdu J-20, known as the Mighty Dragon, represents not only China's technological progress in fifth-generation stealth fighters but also its ambition to rewrite the rules of the global military balance.
Unveiled officially in 2011 and declared operational in 2017, the J-20 made China the second country in the world, after the United States, to field a fully operational stealth fighter, a milestone in the history of military aviation. The aircraft combines low observability, high maneuverability, long range and advanced sensor systems, challenging the Western air dominance traditionally led by aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II.
More than a showcase of advanced engineering, the J-20 reflects an air power strategy designed for highly contested environments, expanding China's ability to protect its regional interests and project influence globally. Its development, which blends homegrown innovation with acquired technology, marks a tectonic shift in the dynamics of air superiority in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.
This report takes an in-depth look at the design, capabilities, operational evolution and strategic significance of the Chengdu J-20, framing its impact not only on Chinese defense doctrine but on the military balance of the 21st century.
Current and planned engines: WS-10C and WS-15
The first J-20s flew with Russian Saturn AL-31FN engines, because domestic fifth-generation engines were running late (China's J-20 fighter seems to have a new homegrown engine, after years of struggle - Breaking Defense). The Chinese WS-10C "Taihang" engine was later introduced as a stopgap (Chengdu J-20 - Wikipedia). The WS-10C offers more thrust and better reliability than earlier versions, plus nozzles with serrated edges to reduce the rear radar signature. It does not, however, have thrust vectoring. China designed the J-20 from the outset to take a more powerful engine: the WS-15 "Emei", with estimated thrust in the 150 kN (15-tonne) range (Mighty Dragon: China's J-20 fleet surges past US in Pacific - Asia Times).
After years of troubled development (a WS-15 even exploded during testing in 2015), the program appears to have matured. In June 2023, a J-20 test aircraft flew for the first time with two WS-15 engines, an important step toward the engine entering service. The WS-15 should give the J-20 the power and range originally planned, enabling supercruise (sustained supersonic flight without afterburner) and improving payload. That performance would bring the J-20 closer to the US F-22 (whose Pratt & Whitney F119 engine also has a thrust-to-weight ratio of ~10). Even so, Chinese analysts admit that the WS-15 does not yet match the durability of US engines and needs more testing before mass production. In short, the J-20 fleet currently flies mainly with WS-10C engines, but WS-15s are expected to power future upgraded J-20s (sometimes referred to as the J-20B) as soon as they are ready.
Stealth design: shaping and materials for low observability
The J-20 was designed with a strong emphasis on stealth, largely following the stealth shaping rules of its US counterpart, the F-22 (A Preliminary Assessment of Specular Radar Cross Section...). It features a streamlined fuselage with a sharp chined nose and a coated canopy (to minimize radar returns from the cockpit), DSI intakes with no diverter ducts (which reduces reflective surfaces) and internal weapons bays (Mighty Dragon: China's J-20 fleet surges past US in Pacific - Asia Times). Its surfaces are deliberately angled to deflect radar energy away from the emitter, and it uses radar-absorbent material (RAM) coatings on the fuselage. Even the exhaust nozzles were redesigned with serrated edges to lower the rear radar signature.
Although it uses forward canards (unusual in Western stealth designs), these are carefully aligned with the wings and other surfaces so as not to significantly increase its radar return. The result is an aircraft with a low radar cross-section; some estimates put it on the order of 0.001–0.01 m², comparable to its US peers. Weapons are carried internally to avoid external loads that would make it easier to detect (Mighty Dragon: China's J-20 fleet surges past US in Pacific - Asia Times). In short, the J-20 achieves low observability by combining stealth geometry, absorbent materials and internal bays, making it hard to detect by radar at long range.
Advanced avionics and sensors
The J-20's avionics reflect China's pursuit of parity with Western fifth-generation fighters. It carries a solid-state AESA radar, presumably the Type 1475 (KLJ-5) with around 2,000 transmit/receive modules, similar in concept to the F-22's AN/APG-77. This radar lets it track multiple targets (up to 20) at long range (possibly >200 km) and guide BVR missiles simultaneously. Complementing the radar, the J-20 integrates an EORD-31 electro-optical infrared search and track (IRST) system and an EOTS-86 electro-optical targeting system, equivalent to the F-35's IR and targeting sensors. These passive sensors can detect the heat signatures of enemy aircraft or missiles without giving away the J-20's position.
For electronic warfare, the J-20 is believed to have an integrated radar warning and countermeasures suite, plus encrypted datalinks for real-time information sharing with other assets (drones, AWACS, wingman J-20s, etc.) (Mighty Dragon: China's J-20 fleet surges past US in Pacific - Asia Times). Analysts note that China has equipped the J-20 with advanced datalinks so it can operate as part of a network much like the F-35, increasing shared situational awareness. The cockpit, for its part, features multifunction displays and possibly a helmet-mounted display (HMD) for target cueing, which is especially useful with its high off-boresight short-range missiles. In short, the J-20's electronics (a wideband AESA radar, IR sensors, secure datalinks and countermeasures) qualify it as a modern fighter able to detect and engage both stealthy and conventional threats across multiple spectra.
Armament: air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground capabilities
The J-20's main armament is optimized for beyond-visual-range (BVR) air superiority. Its internal ventral bays can carry up to four PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, the equivalent of the US AIM-120D, with active radar guidance and an estimated range of 150–200 km. In fact, with adapted rails and folding fins, up to six PL-15s have been shown to fit in the main bay. On each side of the fuselage, the J-20 has small bays for PL-10 short-range missiles, a highly maneuverable infrared weapon for close-in combat comparable to the AIM-9X. These side bays can open briefly to fire and then close again, minimizing the missile's exposure and preserving stealth even when launching a PL-10.
China is also developing more advanced air-to-air missiles for the J-20: the very long-range PL-21 (or PL-17, depending on the source), possibly ramjet-powered or dual-pulse, intended to take out enemy support aircraft (such as AWACS or tankers) hundreds of kilometers away. A slimmer missile, designated PL-16, is reportedly in development to increase internal capacity. With these weapons, the J-20 could strike both rival fighters and high-value strategic air targets from long distances.
Although its primary role is air-to-air, the J-20 is not limited to it. Its designers envisage secondary missions such as ground attack or anti-radiation strikes. It can use small precision-guided munitions (such as 50-100 kg LS-6 glide bombs) in its internal bays. It could also launch anti-radiation missiles against enemy SAM systems, using its low signature to penetrate defenses. However, since the priority is not to compromise stealth, the J-20 is unlikely to carry heavy external weapons except in extreme cases. Indeed, although it can technically mount up to 4 underwing pylons for fuel tanks or additional missiles, doing so would drastically increase its radar return and would normally be avoided in combat. It is worth noting that the J-20 has no internal cannon, unlike many fighters; China chose to rely on missiles for close-in combat, which could be a limitation in a short-range dogfight once the missiles run out. In short, the J-20 is armed mainly with state-of-the-art air-to-air missiles (long-range PL-15 and short-range PL-10), with potential for limited air-to-ground missions, always keeping to the "first look, first shot" philosophy of a stealth air superiority fighter (Chengdu J-20 - Wikipedia).
The J-20's role in China's military strategy
The J-20's deployment fits China's doctrine of denying the adversary air superiority and strengthening its area-denial strategy. What follows examines its role in the A2/AD concept, how it compares with other fifth-generation fighters, and how the J-20 fleet is expected to evolve.
Role in A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) doctrine
China has developed an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy to deter or complicate military intervention by foreign powers (chiefly the United States) in nearby regions such as the China Seas or Taiwan. The strategy combines long-range missile systems, air defense and naval and air capabilities to keep enemy forces at bay. The J-20 makes a major contribution to the A2/AD architecture by providing long-range stealth air superiority. Thanks to its low observability and long-range BVR missiles, a J-20 could slip in or launch surprise attacks against an adversary's critical assets, such as refueling aircraft, airborne C2 nodes (AWACS) or even bombers, before being detected. In this way it extends an anti-access "bubble" well beyond China's coastline.
Western analysts suggest that the J-20 may be optimized to hunt support targets such as the tankers and airborne radars that sustain US air operations (Stealth Showdown: America's F-22 Raptor vs China's J-20 (Who...). By destroying or driving off these force multipliers, the J-20 would weaken US power projection in the Pacific. Its long-range PL-15 missiles, potentially able to hit targets at 200 km or more, would reinforce that "AWACS killer" role. And as a heavy stealth fighter with a large combat radius, the J-20 can patrol farther from the coast without tanker support, covering the First Island Chain. A USAF study center notes that the J-20 is designed to "operate at long distances without nearby tankers, striking where it hurts the enemy air force most: its support assets" (China's J-20 Stealth Fighter Will Likely Look Like This At Its Air Show...).
Within the A2/AD system, the J-20 complements China's dense network of surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles. For example, while DF-21D anti-ship missiles can threaten aircraft carriers from land, J-20s could intercept the carrier-based fighters or reconnaissance aircraft that accompany those naval groups. They could also contest escort air superiority, forcing enemy fighters (F-35s, F/A-18s, etc.) onto the defensive. In short, the J-20 fits into A2/AD as an offensive air-denial weapon: it extends China's lethal reach in the air, complicates enemy operations inside the "denied zone" and strengthens deterrence by showing that even advanced enemy assets could be vulnerable if they venture within Chinese range.
Comparison with other fifth-generation fighters (F-22, F-35, Su-57)
The J-20 is often compared with its fifth-generation counterparts: the US F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II, and Russia's Su-57 Felon. Technically, each takes a different approach:
- Chengdu J-20 (China): A large twin-engine fighter (approx. 23 m long), designed primarily for long-range air superiority. It stands out for its long operational range and a spacious weapons bay that lets it carry large missiles. Its frontal stealth is high, although possibly somewhat below an F-22's from certain angles because of the canards. Its weak point so far has been the engines (the lower-thrust WS-10C), but the WS-15 will close the power gap (China's J-20 fighter seems to have a new homegrown engine, after years of struggle - Breaking Defense). It is not particularly agile in a close-in dogfight (current models have no internal cannon and no thrust vectoring), but it is built to avoid that scenario through stealth and highly maneuverable missiles (PL-10). In avionics, the J-20 has an AESA radar and advanced datalinks, approaching the sensor fusion capability of the F-35 (Mighty Dragon: China's J-20 fleet surges past US in Pacific - Asia Times). All in all, the J-20 is comparable in size to the F-22, with somewhat less stealth but greater range and payload, and is geared toward downing key air targets and imposing air denial.
- F-22 Raptor (US): The benchmark for stealth air superiority fighters. Smaller than the J-20 (19 m), extremely maneuverable (it has thrust-vectoring nozzles and an excellent thrust-to-weight ratio), and exceptionally stealthy from every angle. The F-22 carries AIM-120s and AIM-9s in similar internal bays, but its unrefueled range is shorter than the J-20's (it prioritized maneuverability over range). The Raptor has a powerful AESA radar and electronic warfare systems, albeit a generation older than the F-35's. The F-22 was designed purely for air-to-air dominance; unlike the J-20, it has no significant ground-attack capability and no standard IR sensors. Strategically, the US built only 187 F-22s, capping its numbers, while China plans hundreds of J-20s. By 2025, China may well have more operational J-20s in the Asia-Pacific than the US has F-22s deployed.
- F-35 Lightning II (US): A lighter single-engine fighter (15.7 m) with a multirole profile. Compared with the J-20 and F-22, the F-35 is slower and less agile, but it excels in sensors and networking: its data fusion, 360º sensors (including the EO-DAS IR camera) and ability to act as an information node outclass other fighters. Its frontal stealth is also of a very high order (similar to the F-22's). Internally it carries 4 AIM-120 missiles or 2 907 kg bombs, a smaller load than the J-20 or F-22; however, it can carry more on external pylons when stealth is not critical. Unlike the J-20, the F-35 does have an internal cannon (on the A variant) and is very well suited to ground attack. Strategically, the US and its allies plan to acquire thousands of F-35s over the coming decades; by 2023 there were already about 630 in service. In a hypothetical engagement, an F-35 has the edge in networked warfare and electronic attack, while a J-20 could outdo it in speed, ceiling and perhaps missile range.
- Su-57 Felon (Russia): Russia's contender, a twin-engine stealth fighter of indigenous design. The Su-57 is slightly smaller than the J-20 (20 m) and emphasizes supermaneuverability (it has 3D thrust vectoring and high aerobatic performance). It uses some stealth features, but its RCS is larger than that of the J-20 or F-35 (its nozzles, for example, are not serrated). Russia has struggled to produce it in quantity; it has barely a dozen in service, and the definitive engines (Izdeliye 30) are still in development. In avionics it lags behind Western fighters, although it does have an AESA radar and IRST sensors. The Su-57 can carry missiles in internal bays, but its weapons volume is smaller than the J-20's. Strategically, Russia has been unable to field the Su-57 at scale, while China is already producing the J-20 in considerable numbers. China may even overtake Russia in operational experience with stealth fighters by around 2025.
In short, strategically the J-20 represents China's effort to close the gap with the US in advanced aviation technology. While a Raptor remains a formidable opponent one-on-one (thanks to its stealth and maneuverability), China could offset that with larger numbers of J-20s deployed regionally (Chengdu J-20 - Wikipedia). Indeed, by around 2023 China is estimated to have had some 200-250 operational J-20s, with production accelerating (possibly to as many as 100 a year). That scale contrasts with the 187 F-22s in existence (not all of them in the Pacific) and the US F-35s deployed in Asia, suggesting that the numerical balance of stealth fighters in the region could tip in China's favor in the short term. The J-20, the F-22/F-35 and the Su-57 have different strengths, but the mere existence of the J-20 has forced Western planners to revisit their assumptions: China is no longer simply a consumer of technology but a producer of top-tier combat aircraft competing in the fifth-generation league.
How the J-20 fleet has evolved and where it is deployed
Since its introduction in 2017, the J-20 fleet has grown rapidly. It first equipped test and training units, but by 2019 the first operational regiment had been formed in the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). In 2021, the J-20 with domestic WS-10C engines made its public debut at the Zhuhai Airshow, demonstrating China's confidence in the design. As of July 2023, China was estimated to have produced around 200–250 J-20s, and the production rate was increasing. Defense analysts predict that by 2027 the number of J-20s could match or exceed the US F-22 fleet (187 aircraft). In fact, if the projected production rate holds (up to 100 aircraft a year by the mid-2020s), the PLAAF could be operating several hundred J-20s by the end of the decade.
As for deployment, the J-20 currently serves in several key theaters. The PLAAF has stood up J-20 squadrons in the Eastern Theater (facing Taiwan and the East China Sea) and the Southern Theater (South China Sea), providing a deterrent presence in those sensitive areas. J-20s have also been reported operating from inland bases such as those in Xinjiang, possibly to provide air cover in the Western Theater (the borders with India and Central Asia) or for high-altitude training. J-20 early-warning patrols near the Taiwan Strait and over the East China Sea have already taken place, and a close encounter between J-20s and US F-35s over the East China Sea was even reported in 2022, illustrating the aircraft's increasingly operational role.
China is also exploring variants and upgrades of the J-20. In 2024 a two-seat J-20 (designated J-20S) was officially announced, the world's first two-seat stealth fighter. The second crew member could coordinate swarms of supporting drones or manage complex networked attacks (Chengdu J-20 - Wikipedia), multiplying the fighter's capabilities. There is also speculation about naval or specialized versions, although China's next-generation carrier will apparently use the new FC-31/J-35 fighter rather than a navalized J-20. Even so, the two-seat J-20 suggests that China intends to use the platform as an advanced airborne command node as well.
In terms of incremental upgrades, besides bringing the WS-15 engine into production, there is talk of fitting future J-20s with thrust-vectoring nozzles (a prototype performed maneuvers suggesting 2D thrust vectoring). The integration of new missiles (PL-21/PL-17) and possibly stealth improvements (new coatings) are also under way. Each new J-20 production tranche brings upgrades, much as the F-35 periodically upgrades its software/hardware block.
Operationally, the PLAAF has begun training aggressively with the J-20 in realistic exercises. As early as 2018, barely a year after entering service, J-20s took part in exercises against fourth-generation J-16 and J-10C fighters, shooting them down in BVR scenarios. Today, J-20s train under the "realistic combat conditions" emphasized by China's military reforms (Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military | Council on Foreign Relations). They have also appeared on joint patrols with other aircraft (for example, escorting H-6 bombers). Everything indicates that the J-20 is being fully integrated into the Chinese order of battle (ORBAT) and that its numbers and strategic importance will grow in the years ahead, strengthening China's air posture in potential conflicts.
China's military power in 2025: an overview
Over the past two decades China has carried out a comprehensive modernization of its armed forces (the PLA), turning a force that was large but outdated in many branches into a technologically advanced, balanced one. Below is a detailed look at the current state (approx. 2025) of its main components: the Air Force, the Navy, the ground forces, the missile program, and its capabilities in the cyber and space domains.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
The People's Liberation Army Air Force has advanced enormously since 2000. According to Pentagon reports, by 2015 the PLAAF already had ~600 modern combat aircraft and was retiring obsolete models at a steady pace (People's Liberation Army Air Force - Wikipedia). The share of fourth-generation fighters (J-10, J-11, Su-30, etc.) rose from barely 30% in 2010 to 50% in 2015, with modern aircraft projected to make up the majority soon after. In 2025, the PLAAF consists predominantly of advanced fourth-generation and fifth-generation fighters, having left the old J-7s (MiG-21) and J-8s behind.
The current pillars of Chinese combat aviation include the J-10C (a medium multirole fighter with AESA radar, comparable to an advanced F-16), the J-16 (a heavy twin-engine fighter derived from the Su-30, upgraded with Chinese avionics and weapons and equivalent to an F-15E in air-to-surface and air superiority capabilities) (Operational and Training Constraints in China's Air Force), and, as we have seen, the stealthy J-20. China also operates some 24 Su-35S fighters acquired from Russia, although they matter less than domestic production. In total, the PLAAF is estimated to have on the order of 1,500–2,000 combat aircraft, the vast majority of which are already "gen 4+" or better. One indicator: by 2021 the PLAAF had at least 14 air brigades equipped with modern 4.5-generation fighters (J-10C/J-16) and 3 brigades with fifth-generation aircraft (J-20) (PDF PLA Aerospace Power: - Air University), a number that will have grown since then.
It is not just fighters: the PLAAF has also upgraded its bombers and transports. The H-6 bombers (derived from the old Tu-16) were upgraded to H-6K/N versions with new engines and the ability to launch long-range cruise missiles (such as the CJ-20), giving them precision strike capability out to the Second Island Chain (Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military | Council on Foreign Relations). A stealth strategic bomber, the H-20, is even reported to be in development for roles similar to the US B-2/B-21, although it has not been confirmed for 2025. In transport, China introduced the Y-20 "Kunpeng", a heavy transport aircraft similar in size to a C-17, which together with derived tankers (Y-20U) improves the logistics and operational reach of Chinese forces.
The PLAAF has also consolidated its airborne early warning capability with AWACS such as the KJ-500 (a turboprop-based AEW&C radar aircraft) and the KJ-2000 (based on the Il-76), which are crucial for wide-area surveillance and fighter control. High-altitude drones such as the WZ-7 Soaring Dragon provide strategic reconnaissance. All these improvements go hand in hand with training reforms: the emphasis is on flying farther, over open water, and under simulated real combat conditions. According to the PLA itself, the PLAAF trains in "realistic combat conditions" scenarios to sharpen joint integration and response in complex situations. In short, by 2025 the Chinese Air Force is a modern, professional force, very different from that of past decades, and increasingly close in quality (though not in real combat experience) to advanced Western air forces.
Navy (PLAN) modernization: aircraft carriers, submarines and destroyers
The Liaoning (CV-16), China's first aircraft carrier, sailing near Hong Kong (2017). The ship symbolizes the transformation of the Chinese Navy.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has seen perhaps the most remarkable expansion of all the branches. Today it is numerically the largest navy in the world by hull count. In 2022 it had some 340 combat ships, and the Pentagon projects ~400 ships by 2025 (Pentagon: Chinese Navy to Expand to 400 Ships by 2025, Growth...). This rapid expansion covers every major category: aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, destroyers, frigates and amphibious ships.
Aircraft carriers: China has gone from having none to fully operating two, with a third in trials. The Liaoning (CV-16), commissioned in 2012, was an unfinished Soviet hull (the Varyag) that China completed and modernized. It serves mainly for training and testing, although it is operational with an embarked air wing of J-15 fighters. It was followed by the Shandong (CV-17), the first carrier built in China (Type 002), commissioned in 2019 and very similar to the Liaoning (both are STOBAR ski-jump carriers). In 2022 the Fujian (CV-18), a Type 003, was launched: much larger, with electromagnetic catapults (CATOBAR) and a design closer to modern supercarriers (although conventionally powered, not nuclear). The Fujian is expected to enter service around 2025-2026 after fitting out and trials. With catapults, it will be able to launch heavier aircraft such as early-warning aircraft (the KJ-600 type) and improved versions of naval stealth fighters (possibly the J-35). These carriers reflect China's ambition to project naval power far from its shores. While they still trail the US Navy in numbers and experience (the US has decades of carrier doctrine), the PLAN is closing the gap: it may be planning a fourth carrier, potentially nuclear-powered, by the end of the decade.
Nuclear submarines: China has invested in a balanced submarine fleet with attack (SSN) and ballistic missile (SSBN) boats. In 2025, China's SSNs include the Type 093 Shang class and its improved 093A/B version, which, although noisier than the latest Western or Russian boats, are a leap beyond the old Type 091. China is believed to be working on a new-generation Type 095 with significant stealth improvements. As for strategic submarines, the PLAN operates at least 6 Type 094 Jin SSBNs armed with JL-2 ballistic missiles (range ~7,000 km) capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the backbone of China's sea-based nuclear deterrent. A Type 094 on patrol in the western Pacific can threaten the continental United States. A future Type 096 SSBN is thought to be in development, carrying the new, longer-range JL-3 missile. Beyond the nuclear fleet, China maintains ~50 diesel-electric submarines, many of them modern AIP boats (such as the Yuan class/Type 039A) for close-in defense and littoral operations. Overall, China's submarine force has become very large and more sophisticated, posing a detection challenge for rivals in Asia-Pacific waters.
Destroyers and surface ships: The PLAN has launched an impressive number of destroyers in a short time. The standouts are the Type 052D destroyers and the large Type 055 destroyers:
- The Type 055 (Renhai class) is a 13,000-tonne warship, comparable to a cruiser, with 112 VLS cells for missiles (HHQ-9B air defense, YJ-18 anti-ship, anti-submarine and even land-attack missiles). It carries a four-faced AESA radar and substantial fleet command capabilities. Eight Type 055 destroyers were launched between 2018 and 2022, and there may be more. It is officially a "destroyer", but in size and firepower it is similar to the US Navy's AEGIS cruisers (Meet the Type 055 destroyers steering China's blue-water ambitions...).
- The Type 052D (Luyang III class) is a ~7,500-tonne destroyer with 64 VLS cells, a phased-array radar and modern weapons. China has built at least 25 of them since 2014, roughly matching the entire destroyer count of some European navies in under a decade. They offer balanced area air defense, anti-ship and ASW capabilities.
This new generation of ships, together with Type 054A frigates (about 30 units) and Type 056 corvettes, has rejuvenated China's surface fleet, which once relied on ships derived from Soviet designs. In 2025, the PLAN has a modern surface fleet, equipped with long-range air defense systems, advanced cruise missiles and sensors comparable to international standards. The Chinese navy can now operate farther from the coast, escorting its carriers or patrolling the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.
On top of these, the Navy has introduced large Type 075 (Yushen class) amphibious assault ships, equivalent to LHDs, to deploy marines and helicopters, increasing its ability to project forces in potential scenarios such as the South China Sea or even Taiwan. All of this is backed by an infrastructure of bases and shipyards that turns out ships on an astonishing scale; China's naval industrial complex can now build multiple high-tech hulls simultaneously (Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military | Council on Foreign Relations). Meanwhile, training and operational experience are building up quickly through constant long-range naval exercises, including joint maneuvers with Russia and intense activity around Taiwan.
In short, the Chinese Navy in 2025 is an emerging blue-water force: with carriers in operation, numerous modern destroyers and capable submarines, it has gone from a defensive regional force to a navy with oceangoing ambitions. The Pentagon projects 395 ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030, showing that the expansion continues. This poses a direct challenge to the naval supremacy that the US and its allies have held in the Pacific since World War II.
Ground forces: modernizing armor, artillery and mechanized units
The PLA Army (PLAA) was traditionally the largest but least modernized branch. Since 2010, however, it has undergone significant restructuring and re-equipment. China cut troop numbers, disbanded old divisions and created smaller but more capable combined arms brigades equipped with modern armor.
In tanks and armored vehicles, the ground force has introduced competitive third-generation tanks. The main one is the Type 99A, a ~55-tonne main battle tank with a high-pressure 125 mm gun, composite armor and advanced ERA, a modern fire control system and the ability to fire gun-launched guided missiles. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, "the PLA is modernizing its armored units by fielding third-generation tanks with improved armor, larger-caliber guns, improved fire control systems and advanced electronics," the most capable being the Type 96A and Type 99A (Tank wars: China’s Type 99 vs the M1 Abrams - Asia Times). This has put Chinese armor on a par with Western armor in firepower and protection. In fact, the Type 99A "holds its own" in armament against tanks such as the M1A2 Abrams, although its performance in electronics and active protection is still debated. For terrain where the Type 99 would be too heavy (high mountains, jungle), China developed the Type 15 (ZTQ-15), a light tank (~33 tonnes) with a 105 mm gun and high mobility, designed to operate in Tibet and border areas as well as in amphibious support. With it, the PLA covers the full weight range, from heavy tanks to highly deployable light ones.
For infantry fighting vehicles and transport, the ground force uses the Type 04A IFV (ZBD-04A) with a 30 mm cannon and HJ-10 missiles, and modular Type 08 (ZBL-08) 8x8 vehicles for troop transport, reconnaissance and support, comparable to the Western Stryker or LAV. This markedly improves the mobility and firepower of China's mechanized brigades.
Chinese artillery has also made a leap: the latest-generation 155 mm self-propelled howitzers have been fielded, such as the tracked PLZ-05 and the newer truck-mounted (and highly mobile) PCL-181, both with digital fire control and guided munitions. In multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), China introduced the modular PCH191 (sometimes designated AR-2), which can fire 300 mm satellite-guided rockets with a range of 100+ km or even 750 mm tactical ballistic missiles (of the Fire Dragon 480 type) with a range of over 300 km. This system gives the PLA long-range precision ground firepower with no close equivalent in most Western armies (China's Type 99 Main Battle Tank is a Pretty Fearsome Beast) (Defense Intelligence Agency, “China Military Power). Multiple PCH191 and PLZ-05 battalions now equip the artillery brigades, integrated into C4ISR networks to strike targets at long range.
The ground units have been reorganized into 13 more compact Group Armies (down from 18 in the past), each with several combined arms brigades (heavy, medium or light depending on their equipment). "Heavy" brigades field Type 99As and fighting vehicles, "medium" ones lighter wheeled armor, and "light" ones are air-transportable or assault units (some with fast all-terrain vehicles). The reorganization aims at more flexible command and faster reaction. Army training has also added more demanding live-fire exercises and simulated opposition forces (pitting "red" brigades against "blue" ones using NATO tactics at training bases such as Zhurihe).
Even so, China's ground force has no real combat experience since the brief Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979, so the effectiveness of these upgrades would only be seen in an actual conflict. Still, the material improvements are undeniable: today's Chinese tanks and armored vehicles are on a par with world standards, and massive domestic production ensures China can equip its large forces. So much so that the US Office of the Secretary of Defense noted in 2019 that "China can produce ground systems at or near world-class levels; however, quality deficiencies persist in some equipment" (Tank wars: China’s Type 99 vs the M1 Abrams - Asia Times). In other words, while the hardware is modern, aspects such as mechanical or electronic reliability may still need work. Overall, by 2025 the PLA's ground force has shed its image of "a huge infantry with old tanks" and looks more like a high-tech mechanized army, ready for rapid internal deployments and for deterrence along sensitive borders.
The missile program: ballistic (DF-21D, DF-26) and hypersonic (DF-17)
China has invested heavily in its Rocket Force (PLARF) to build a missile arsenal that underpins its A2/AD strategy and regional deterrence. Among the most significant are the medium-range anti-ship ballistic missiles and the new hypersonic vehicles, which mark a shift in precision warfare.
DF-21D "Carrier Killer": A medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the first of its kind, designed to hit moving ships, aircraft carriers in particular. Nicknamed the "carrier killer", the DF-21D entered limited service around 2010 (China’s “Carrier Killer”: The DF-21D – The Diplomat). It has an estimated range of ~1,500 km and carries a maneuverable warhead with a radar seeker to locate the carrier during reentry. In desert tests, China has shown the DF-21D can hit targets the size of a carrier deck, leaving precise craters (China tests DF-21D missile on mock US aircraft carrier in Gobi desert). The system gives China the ability to strike a high-value enemy ship from dry land, making it a central element of maritime "area denial". To be effective against a carrier on the high seas, it needs real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) from satellites, OTH radars and drones to supply an up-to-date target location. The West considers the DF-21D a disruptive weapon because it undermines the traditional impunity of aircraft carriers; countermeasures such as stronger naval missile defense and dispersal tactics have been developed. But the mere existence of the DF-21D is a serious deterrent: a "warning to the US", as Chinese headlines put it, given that its main target is clearly US naval groups.
DF-26 "Guam Express": A more versatile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). With a range of ~4,000 km, the DF-26 can threaten both ships in the South China Sea and bases on Guam (hence its nicknames "Guam killer" and "Guam Express") (China increases number of DF-26 'Guam killer' nuclear missiles in...). It is dual-capable, nuclear or conventional; notably, it can switch quickly between a nuclear and a conventional warhead in the field, which gives it strategic flexibility. The DF-26 can carry out precision strikes against land targets (hangars, runways, bunkers) or serve as an anti-ship missile with a longer range than the DF-21D. In August 2020, China fired at least one into an area of the South China Sea as a demonstration of capability (“Warning to the United States!” China Fires DF-26B & DF-21D Anti...). The Pentagon reported a rapid increase in these missiles: between 2021 and 2022, China's DF-26 IRBM inventory grew from 300 to 500. This underlines the priority Beijing gives to saturating potential enemy defenses with massive ballistic missile strikes. With multiple DF-26 brigades deployed, China can launch salvos against US and allied bases in the region (Guam, Okinawa, etc.) and against forward-deployed ships, seriously complicating any adversary response.
The US Department of Defense highlights that the DF-26 is capable of "precision strikes against targets in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea from mainland China," switching between anti-ship and land-attack roles (Why China's DF-26 Missile Is so Dangerous for the US Military - Business Insider). That combination of range and precision makes it one of the most dangerous missiles in China's arsenal. Together with the DF-21D, the DF-26 forms a pair of "carrier killers" at different ranges, designed to confront enemy naval forces with a dilemma: move in and risk a devastating blow, or stay out of range and give up any influence over the conflict zone.
DF-17 and hypersonics: China is also leading the development of a new class of hypersonic missiles. The DF-17 is an MRBM that carries a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) known as the DF-ZF. Reaching speeds of Mach 5-10, the glider can maneuver in the upper atmosphere, following unpredictable trajectories at lower altitude than a standard ballistic reentry (DF-17 | Missile Threat). This makes it extremely hard to detect and intercept with conventional missile defenses. The DF-17, with a range of ~1,800–2,500 km, entered service around 2019. Its stated purpose is to "enable rapid, high-precision strikes that leave the enemy little time to react". Flying at hypersonic speeds while maneuvering, it can evade systems such as naval Aegis or THAAD and penetrate defenses to reach critical targets (e.g. air bases, command centers) within minutes. The weapon boosts China's preemptive strike capability in a regional conflict and undermines confidence in today's missile shields.
Beyond the DF-17, intelligence reports indicate that in 2021 China tested an even more advanced hypersonic system (sometimes nicknamed the DF-27), potentially capable of partially circling the globe (a fractional orbital system) before releasing a hypersonic glider over the target. Its sophistication reportedly took US agencies by surprise. Although the details are classified, it shows China's determination to lead the hypersonic race. At the same time, hypersonic air-to-surface and ship-launched cruise missiles are in development, bringing this technology to every branch.
Other missiles: The PLARF also operates numerous shorter-range theater missiles such as the DF-16 (an improved 800-1,000 km SRBM) and a large arsenal of SRBMs (DF-11, DF-15) that threaten Taiwan and nearby targets. Ground-launched cruise missiles such as the CJ-10 complement these with precision strikes at 1,500+ km on low-altitude, terrain-hugging flight paths. At the strategic intercontinental nuclear level, China fields the DF-31A/AG (road-mobile) and DF-41 ICBMs (the newest, with a range of >12,000 km and MIRVs), ensuring a nuclear second-strike capability against the US and Russia. China still keeps its nuclear arsenal relatively small compared with the superpowers, although it is growing. In 2023, the Pentagon estimated that China could reach 700 nuclear warheads by 2027, partly thanks to the expansion of DF-41 silos detected in western China.
In conclusion, China's missile program gives the PLA long-range firepower unmatched in Asia. Missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26 provide the "hard" component of area denial, threatening enemy naval forces and key installations. New hypersonic systems such as the DF-17 take that threat to a higher level, reducing the opponent's chances of defending itself. This multiplicity of delivery systems (ballistic, cruise, hypersonic) and ranges, combined with an integrated strategy, is central to China's doctrine of gaining the advantage in the opening salvos of a conflict, keeping the adversary at a distance and striking at its weak points.
Cyber and space warfare capabilities
China sees cyber and space warfare as critical arenas for global superiority, and it has built dedicated structures to dominate them. In 2015 it created the Strategic Support Force (SSF), a joint command in charge of operations in cyberspace, space and electronic warfare. By 2025, China had reorganized these forces yet again, bringing them under new "Aerospace Force" and "Cyberspace Force" departments (The Expansion of China's Military Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Implications for Space as a Contested Domain), a sign of how much importance it attaches to them.
In the cyber domain, China has formidable offensive and defensive capabilities. Over the past decade it has professionalized hacker teams and military cyberwarfare units whose operations range from mass espionage to attacks on infrastructure. According to a USCC report, "China has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities and poses a formidable threat to the US in cyberspace. Its operations are increasingly stealthy, agile and dangerous" (China's Cyber Capabilitities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States). Chinese doctrine treats cyberspace as one more front of warfare, where the battlefield is prepared ahead of an armed conflict. In other words, in a crisis, China's cyber units (many of them under the SSF) would try to infiltrate, sabotage and blind the adversary's systems (command networks, communications satellites, power grids and so on) to paralyze the enemy's response. The PLA actively trains in tactics to "deny the enemy communications, radar and navigation (GPS) support" through electronic warfare and cyberattacks.
China is a leader in vulnerability exploitation: it has legally required domestic technology companies to report vulnerability findings to the government before making them public. It is also credited with massive intellectual property theft campaigns (for example, the OPM hack and the theft of F-35 data in the 2010s). All of this gives it a stockpile of zero-days and backdoors to use in a conflict. The SSF plans for the ability to paralyze an adversary's critical infrastructure and steal key information for strategic advantage. A Pentagon report suggests that under Xi Jinping China has become "risk-tolerant" in space and cyber, willing to escalate to secure political objectives even at the cost of international friction.
Organizationally, the SSF has been the spearhead of Chinese cyberwarfare (China's Cyber Capabilitities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States). Its hackers (sometimes working alongside the Ministry of State Security) have penetrated military and civilian networks worldwide. In military exercises, the PLA includes cyberattack scenarios to simulate degrading enemy communications. In short, China sees the cyber domain as a place to win without fighting, where it can already inflict significant damage on militarily stronger powers.
In the space domain, China has also advanced aggressively. Recognizing how heavily the US depends on satellites (GPS, communications, ISR), China has developed counterspace capabilities to deny the enemy that asset. As early as 2007, it stunned the world by using an ASAT missile to destroy an old weather satellite in low Earth orbit, demonstrating a kinetic kill capability in space. It has refined that capability ever since: it now has an operational DA-ASAT (direct-ascent anti-satellite) system with which the PLA trains regularly (The Expansion of China's Military Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Implications for Space as a Contested Domain). In 2013 it launched a rocket that reached near-geostationary altitude, hinting that it is working on ASAT weapons able to reach satellites at 36,000 km (such as communications and GPS satellites).
It doesn't stop at destructive missiles: China has put "inspector" satellites such as Shijian-17 and Shijian-21 into orbit, capable of approaching other satellites, docking with them or manipulating them. These servicing satellites can be used as dual-use weapons; with a robotic arm, for example, they can grab an adversary's satellite or damage it permanently. In 2024, the US observed Chinese orbital maneuvers that appeared to rehearse "satellite-on-satellite combat", described by a Space Force general as dogfighting in space. China also has ground-based laser weapons capable of blinding or damaging satellite sensors from Earth. According to the DIA, it has multiple ground-based laser systems to interfere with or degrade satellites in low orbits.
China complements these offensive capabilities with its own satellite constellation: the Beidou system (China's GPS) with global coverage, numerous radar and electro-optical observation satellites for tracking ships (key to guiding DF-21D/26 missiles), secure military communications satellites and more. This gives it independence from the US GPS system and redundant communications in a conflict.
Organizationally, after designating space as a warfighting domain, China centralized its military space assets under the SSF. In 2024, however, it decided to disband the SSF as an independent branch and redistribute it into departments (Aerospace, Cyberspace, etc.) reporting directly to the central command. This suggests a desire to better integrate space forces with the other branches, perhaps much like the creation of the Space Force in the US.
Ultimately, China has turned space into contested territory. It can strike satellites in low orbit today, and probably in medium/high orbit in the near future. It integrates electronic warfare to jam signals (GPS, datalinks) in its exercises. And it plans to use these capabilities from the very start of a war, knowing that blinding the adversary's "vision" and communications would give it an enormous advantage. Its doctrine speaks of "striking the vital points of the enemy system" in a multi-domain warfare context, and, implicitly, satellites and cyber networks are those vital points. China is thus preparing to challenge the US for supremacy in the "global commons" of cyberspace and space, adding new dimensions to any future conflict.
Wrapping up: China's capabilities, pros and cons
Taken together, China's armed forces in 2025 show a combination of advanced technology, greater professionalization and a strategy focused on denying adversaries their traditional advantages. The J-20 Mighty Dragon fighter exemplifies China's qualitative leap, fitting into an A2/AD doctrine that seriously challenges the power projection of outside powers. Naval and nuclear modernization, a powerful arsenal of precision missiles, and moves into new domains (hypersonics, cyber, space) have raised China to the status of a front-line military power in the Asia-Pacific.
Advantages (pros) of China's capabilities
- Cutting-edge, fast-growing military technology: China has fielded stealth fighters (J-20) and hypersonic missiles (DF-17) that were once the preserve of the US or Russia, closing technology gaps (Mighty Dragon: China's J-20 fleet surges past US in Pacific - Asia Times). Its industrial base can mass-produce ships, aircraft and armored vehicles close to the level of the world's best. That lets it equip its forces with modern equipment in large quantities, something its rivals may struggle to match. The introduction of aircraft carriers, the Type 055, the Type 99A and more shows broad modernization across every sector.
- An effective A2/AD approach: China's capabilities significantly complicate any enemy intervention on its periphery. Its "carrier killer" ballistic missiles (DF-21D/DF-26) and its growing fleet of J-20s and modern ships create a dense defensive-offensive bubble around China. This acts as a credible deterrent, forcing the US and its allies to take extreme precautions and disperse their resources. The combination of missile saturation, stealthy air denial and regional naval power represents a shift in the military balance in the western Pacific in China's favor.
- Integration of new domains (cyber/space): China has proved very active in cyber and counterspace warfare, preparing to "blind and deafen" a technologically dependent adversary. Its investments in ASAT weapons and lasers, and its huge state-backed hacking apparatus, give it a major asymmetric advantage, since it can attack an enemy's vulnerabilities without facing it head-on in conventional combat. Being able to destroy satellites or shut down an adversary's power grids increases China's capacity for strategic coercion and surprise.
- Volume and regional presence: Numerically, the PLA is overwhelming in its home theater. The PLAN already outnumbers the US Navy in the region in ships (Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military | Council on Foreign Relations), the PLAAF, with hundreds of J-10/11/16s and dozens of J-20s, has local numerical superiority over regional air forces, and its ballistic missiles can rain down by the hundreds on nearby targets. That critical mass, combined with proximity (fighting "at home" on interior lines), would give China a logistical advantage and staying power in a conflict in Asia, at least initially.
- Political resolve and internal reforms: President Xi Jinping has made raising the PLA's readiness and combat effectiveness a priority, purging corruption and pushing for training under realistic conditions (Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military | Council on Foreign Relations). Continued modernization despite the costs signals strong political commitment. This means the capabilities described here are not static: China keeps improving, testing and learning, becoming more dangerous over time.
Disadvantages (cons) and limitations of China's capabilities
- Lack of real combat experience: A fundamental weakness is that the PLA has not fought a large-scale war in more than 40 years. It has not tested its new systems or its officer corps under enemy fire. This contrasts with Western forces that have experience in recent conflicts. As RAND puts it, "how well could the PLA fight? It is an open question, given the lack of battlefield evidence" (The Chinese Military’s Doubtful Combat Readiness: The People’s Liberation Army Remains Focused on Upholding Chinese Communist Party Rule, Not Preparing for War). History shows that advanced hardware does not guarantee performance (as Russia found in 2022). As a result, China's capabilities might underperform because of inexperience, coordination problems under stress or a lack of battle-hardened leadership.
- Internal focus vs. war readiness: Some analysts point out that the PLA remains strongly oriented toward protecting the regime (the CCP) at home rather than honing its warfighting effectiveness. Political loyalty and Party control within the military structure could hinder initiative and adaptability in combat. Prioritizing political objectives could mean that, when the time comes, military decision-making is not purely professional. Together with a traditionally centralized culture, this could limit its tactical flexibility.
- Unproven equipment quality and reliability: While China produces advanced systems, some are still maturing. Engines such as the WS-15 still need work to match the reliability of their Western counterparts (China's J-20 fighter seems to have a new homegrown engine, after years of struggle - Breaking Defense). Chinese electronics and sensors have not been battle-tested either, and how they would actually perform against enemy ECM is unknown. Even the DoD acknowledges that quality deficiencies persist in some Chinese equipment (Tank wars: China’s Type 99 vs the M1 Abrams - Asia Times). Maintenance training, expeditionary logistics support and the durability of systems under heavy use are open questions for a PLA that has only operated in peacetime.
- Weaker global power projection and fewer allies: Despite its growth, China's ability to project power far from its borders (for example, into the Indian Ocean or beyond) is still limited. Its carriers are at an early stage of doctrinal development and cannot be compared with the dozens of veteran US carrier air wings. Nor does China have an extensive network of allied bases (although it is seeking support ports in Pakistan, Africa and elsewhere). In a prolonged or distant conflict, China could face logistical difficulties in exactly the area where the US excels. And unlike the US, China has few declared military allies; it would have to face a potential coalition of countries alone (or with little Russian support).
- Geopolitical environment and countermeasures: China's capabilities have provoked counter-reactions: neighboring countries are investing in quiet submarines, their own missiles and advanced fighters (e.g. Japan acquiring F-35s and developing long-range anti-ship missiles). The US is adjusting its doctrine (concepts such as Distributed Base Operations) and strengthening alliances (the Quad, AUKUS) to offset the A2/AD threat. In other words, many of China's advantages could be counterbalanced by adversary technology and new tactics in an open conflict. For example, if US carriers stay out of DF-21D range and use long-range B-21 stealth bombers with stand-off missiles, they could strike China while avoiding its "kill zone". The contest would be highly dynamic.
- Economic and social factors: China's military modernization is taking place against a backdrop of domestic challenges: economic growth has slowed and the population is aging, which in the long run could constrain the defense budget and recruitment. If the economy falters, sustaining the pace of military spending (already estimated at $330–450 billion a year, the second-largest in the world) could be difficult. Moreover, cutting-edge military innovation requires an open, collaborative research ecosystem; international tensions and export controls may slow China's access to certain technologies (e.g. advanced semiconductors for military AI).
In conclusion, by 2025 China has built a formidable, comprehensive military capability, combining quantity, technological modernity and new strategies, which gives it significant advantages in a conflict close to home. However, it also faces limitations in experience, quality challenges and the strategic response of other powers. The pros (its broad array of advanced systems, its A2/AD doctrine and its local critical mass) make it a tough, credible rival; the cons (no real combat seasoning, possible hidden flaws and enemy countermeasures) mean that superiority is not guaranteed in a prolonged confrontation or outside its comfort zone. Ultimately, China's military capabilities have grown to a tipping point where the rest of the world must take them very seriously (Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military | Council on Foreign Relations), but the final verdict on their effectiveness would only come if they were put to the test in an actual armed conflict.
Sources:
RAND Corporation; US Department of Defense (China Military Power Reports); GlobalSecurity.org; Jane’s Defence; The Diplomat; South China Morning Post; Defense News, among others. (Tank wars: China’s Type 99 vs the M1 Abrams - Asia Times) (Six Takeaways From the Pentagon’s Report on China’s Military | Council on Foreign Relations) (Why China's DF-26 Missile Is so Dangerous for the US Military - Business Insider) (The Expansion of China's Military Space and Counterspace Capabilities and Implications for Space as a Contested Domain)
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